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I am delighted to be back among professors of procedure and other
procedure lovers. For the past sixteen years, since I went to the Bench
in 1972, I have been in exile. The Massachusetts courts have not been
procedure-minded. Rules on the style of the Federal Rules did not ar-
rive until 1974-not a moment too soon. Even so, in our version, we
cut complications like the class-action rule down to size, and we have
passed by recent federal amendments. We have largely suppressed in-
terlocutory reviews of points of procedure. The drive toward decisions
on the merits has been relentless. (Is there anything wrong in all this?)
Anyway, I have been remote from procedural law; and in the presence
of this gathering of hot, up-to-the-minute proceduralists, I feel like Rip
Van Winkle.
Paul Carrington's thoughtful paper has three parts or phases-a
statement of the present rulemaking process; a defense of trans-substan-
tive, loose-textured Rules; and a proposal of rule changes to supplant
the summary-judgment rule and certain related rules. I have a few
comments on each part.
First, Professor Carrington's thesis that the Rules should be "gen-
eral," across-the-board, trans-substantive. This he suggests keeps them
out of political controversy and other troubles at the hands of special
interests.
Professor Carrington connects his thesis to the word "general" as
it appears in the Rules Enabling Act, but "general" may mean only
that the Rules, trans-substantive or not, shall apply equally in all dis-
tricts (subject to permissible local rules).
Professor Carrington qualifies his own position by his espousal of
the "loose texturing" of rules. This, as he recognizes, has permitted the
exercise of judicial discretion precisely to mold procedure so as to pro-
mote the varieties of substantive aims. Is there any inconsistency here
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with the trans-substantive goal?
Professor Carrington does not respond to the claim that differen-
tiations of procedure have in practice already gone very far, by local
rules and otherwise, and the results, we are told, have been not merely
non-toxic but highly beneficial. Indeed, my old friend and co-conspira-
tor, Maurice Rosenberg, has written euphorically: "The key point is
that different categories of cases have different processing needs. These
are identifiable, classifiable, and usable in putting them through the
judicial process."1 Maurice, is that so? We need to be shown.
The crucial word is "categories." No one wants a return to the
categories of the old formulary system: those were dysfunctional. How-
ever, can categories be found pointing to differentiated modes of proce-
dure (not excepting diversions to Alternative Dispute Resolution) that
will improve on the standard mode of the current Rules? What are the
indicia or criteria by which the categories should be defined? How
often will the nature of the substantive law be the key? How often
other factors? At all events, are we willing to accept responsibility for
monitoring and controlling the substantive results of any such diversi-
fied procedures? That's one of Professor Cover's points in his article
honoring James Wm. Moore.' I do no more than put some queries. At
the same time, Paul utters his challenge: "Are there indeed major
problems of civil procedure that would yield more readily to multiple
solutions each fashioned to meet the needs of litigants asserting a par-
ticular set of substantive rights? If so, what are they?"
The basic issue of modifying the trans-substantive character of the
Rules is not being unfurled these days for the first time. As retiring
Reporter, I proposed to the Advisory Committee in 1967 the happy
thought that the question be studied empirically. There was no follow-
up.
Professor Carrington's insistence on trans-substantive, politics-free
Rules led me to speculate on whether he would have thought it a sound
project back in the Sixties to redo the class-action rule. On its face, the
amended rule appears trans-substantive. Yet one could foresee that it
would apply particularly in certain substantive fields such as securities
fraud; and, with no great flight of imagination, one might predict that
the working of the rule must bring about changes of substance-as it
has in fact done in the very fraud field, to cite one instance. To go
further afield, there was a sense in which the amended rule was not
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neutral: it did not escape attention at the time that it would open the
way to the assertion of many, many claims that otherwise would not be
pressed; so the rule would stick in the throats of establishment defend-
ants. Was it then, on principle, a mistake to go ahead? Perhaps, to the
contrary, there is a teaching here against undue timidity in rulemaking.
Ironically, I understand that at this moment, by order of the Judicial
Conference, on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, the
rulemakers are forbidden to undertake any revision of the class-action
rule. And legislative efforts have not prospered.
Second, Professor Carrington offers amendments of a brace of
rules which would encourage the disposition of issues of fact and law as
soon as feasible.
This suggestion is caught up in the push for the speedy finish of
cases short of trial. Recent amendments to the same end leave me-and
possibly Professor Carrington-rather cold. Can heavy sanctions
against abuse of procedural forms, as in Rule 11, really work? I doubt
it; they are negative enforcers which, as B.F. Skinner teaches, are not
calculated to alter conduct. The drive toward settlement, as in Rule 16,
raises doubts about manager-judges, and about the fairness of treaties
of peace reached under hydraulic pressure. By contrast, Professor Car-
rington's proposal is in the more conventional main line, improving, ex-
isting rules by devising better rules. And the challenge is there to disbe-
lievers in trans-substantive rules, as I have said. I like Professor
Carrington's markup. I enjoy the way the several rules are brought
together and harmonized, and I award a nice prize for the elimination
of some of the detritus of history in present Rule 50. But, of course,
there are possible bugs.
I assume, despite fashionable theory to the contrary, that mere
rule changes can mean something and make a difference. Still, I doubt
the proposed new standard to be applied in establishing fact-"A fact
may be established by the court if there is no evidentiary basis for a
reasonable trier of fact to reject that fact"-will actually work a signifi-
cant improvement in the standard or standards now applied under Rule
56. The amendments would hold out a strong invitation to litigants to
try to secure piecemeal decisions of issues of fact and law, perhaps with
accompanying pressure toward interlocutory appeals. Will the possible
gains in individual cases not be overwhelmed by the fuss and bother
and costs and delays in the mass of cases where parties will try to em-
ploy the devices? Will the devices, intended mostly for ramified cases,
be sought needlessly and perversely in simpler cases? Professor Car-
rington recognizes the shoals, but one wonders whether the cautionary
provisions in one of his draft rules will avoid them. I suggest, too, that
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propositions of fact and law, as they appear at the outset of litigation,
may turn out to be quite irrelevant as the case develops, so the whole
proposal is instinct with waste motion in some percentage of cases.
To sum up, I would vote cheerfully to give the proposal its chance.
Maybe there should be some requirement that it be reexamined after a
number of years, but then would we know how to reassess it except by
raw intuition?
Third, Professor Carrington's description of the present rulemak-
ing process from Advisory Committee to Supreme Court and Congress.
Charles Clark seemed to think that rulemaking was really for the
coterie of experts, though some concessions should be made toward in-
forming the public (preferably after the event). In resuming rulemaking
in the 1960s, our Advisory Committee did reach out in moderate fash-
ion for criticism, and I believe the Standing Committee was pretty well
informed of the nature of the debated issues. The drafts and redrafts of
Rules and Notes, however, as published, were rather flat, not fully in-
forming of the pros and cons. That was regrettable.
Professor Carrington shows that the process today invites criticism
and contributions from all and sundry, and is open and candid, thereby,
he suggests, repelling influence by special interests. Under the proposed
legislation now circulating in Congress to revise the Rules Enabling
Act-I have seen one late version-the whole process would be taking
place, firmly, in the glass goldfish bowl. I trust room will still be left
for some private, secret discussion within the Advisory Committee, for
example, to denounce with any expletives such a monstrous decision of
the Supreme Court as Schiavone v. Fortune.3
The legislation, wisely I think, would retain the Supreme Court at
the apex of national rulemaking; I would not substitute the Judicial
Conference. Unwisely, it would largely abrogate the famous provision
by which valid rules supersede inconsistent law. I recommend to you
Professor Carrington's masterly submission to the Senate committee in
support of supersession. The Court acts in rulemaking by a kind of
revocable delegation from Congress, but Congress by the supersession
clause symbolizes its understanding that rulemaking is primar-
ily-although not finally-for the courts.
The legislation would also attempt to put the matter of local
rulemaking and similar activity under some hierarchical control. But on
this I won't testify-the experts are Dean Coquillette and Professor
3 477 U.S. 21 (1986) (misreading Rule 15(c)).
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Subrin and their associates in a big project on local rules run out of
Boston College Law School.

